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1. 
Critical Criticism was described by Marx and Engels as ‘speculative construction’ – 
that is to say, it describes what it thinks it sees, producing in the process a ‘disguised 
theology’, that is unable to penetrate through to the foundational mechanisms of what 
it condemns as wrong. It does not address the dynamic vested interests in the system 
of the world that produce antagonism. Critical criticism remains idealist, floating 
above what it analyses, however critical its stance might be. However, it is notable 
that Marx uses the term critique to describe what he and Engels do to critical 
criticism. Whether an ironic or polemical gesture, criticism is central to Marx – but as 
the subtitle suggests, there is a further dialectical twist to be made as criticism must 
itself be subjected to critique: Critique of Critical Criticism. Critique or Criticism 
(both words are the same in German - Kritik) also occurs in Marx’s key work Capital, 
which has the subtitle ‘a critique of political economy’. Critique has a force – even if 
it might be dismissed by some – vulgar Marxists amongst them - as an evasion of the 
command to act, a stalling action of analysis and reflection. Marx claims, famously, in 
the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1845): ‘Philosophers have interpreted the world in various 
ways, the point however is to change it’. Interpretation, in the philosophical sense, is 
not, then apparently identical with critique. Critique is prerequisite to changing the 
world – or, as later revolutionaries put it in the sloganistic language of dialectics: 
practice must be informed by theory. Critique has a real effect in the world – it is a 
prelude or product of action. Without critique, no revolution and so no ‘ridding’ of 
‘the world of all the muck of ages’, as Marx and Engels put it in The German 
Ideology. 
  
2.  
Subsequent Marxists held on in various ways to Marx and Engels’ sense of critique or 
criticism. Perhaps all the more so as prospects of revolution receded. Marx’s Capital 
was written in a time of retrenchment, some twenty years after the turbulent days of 
1848, when revolutionary fervour swept Europe and beyond. To write Capital’s 
critique of political economy, Marx retreated in part from active political agitation 
into the British Museum Reading Room – a kind of holding operation of analysis in 
order to forward the cause intellectually, logically, ideologically. In the years after the 
Russian revolution of 1917, the revolutionary wave began to spread and then faltered. 
In its wake, another period of critique in Marxism was inaugurated. Critique is often – 
as it must be, if it is not to dogmatise itself - as much about an examination of 
Marxism’s own tenets as it is about the constituents of the surrounding world.  
A work by Georg Lukács, which had an immense effect on a generation of 
European thinkers, disaffected bourgeois sons and daughters alike, set the scene for 
this turn towards critique in the Marxist tradition. After a study of Lenin, Lukács 
published History and Class Consciousness in 1923 and its most influential chapter 
was titled ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’. Consciousness was 
forwarded as an entity worthy of analysis, of critique. The place where critique 
happens – the consciousness - becomes the site of critique, so to speak. Lukács 
attempted to explain the discrepancy between class position and class-consciousness - 
which might be otherwise phrased as the question: why is the working class not 
revolutionary if revolution is in its interests. The orthodox Marxist reply blamed 
institutions of ideological production, such as the media, schools and the church, 
which spread misinformation, illusions or fear and so impeded the development of 
revolutionary consciousness. This rests an Enlightenment notion of ideological 
manipulation, deception, delusion – a falsity need only be pointed out to be overcome. 
Lukács approached the question differently – drawing on Marx’s concept of objective 
illusions, the notion that the false can be real, that the way things appear can be 
simultaneously true and false. Lukács examined the experience of workers under 
capitalism. He considered the ways in which labour power is turned into a 
commodity. Capitalists treat workers’ wage labour as just another commodity to be 
bought and sold on the market. Workers experience themselves as individual atoms 
whose fate is dependent on a force, the market, over which they have no control. 
Their sense of their own powerlessness makes them susceptible to the muck - 
commands issued by hierarchies and bureaucracies and the misty illusions of religion. 
Their susceptibility generates a false perception, a delusion, but this delusion is based 
on a real experience. It is an objective illusion. The false appearance is woven into 
reality itself. The muck is real. The misapprehension of the world is a real 
misapprehension. It is socially produced. Criticism steps up to the task of penetrating 
through the mists of subjective misidentification to expose the deeper motive forces 
that make the surface sense of things appear to be true. But criticism is not enough – 
and the notion of objective illusion renders critique – or philosophy – redundant, in 
much the way Marx argued. If illusions are not a matter of cognition, a misperception 
perpetrated by ideology, then the philosophical critique of falsity is useless. The false 
appearance can only be altered in transforming the essence that produces the 
appearance – anything else is mere analysis, moral denunciation or ethics. Lukács’ 
other insistence concerned the way in which the worker is an object of capital, but 
comes, through political enlightenment to understand that they are also a subject, an 
agent, whose withdrawal of labour causes a collapse of the whole system of 
reproduction. The proletariat can adopt a point of view that sees the world from the 
perspective of an object of capital and a subject of history. This movement in and out 
of the true and the false, the appearance and the essence, the subject and the object: all 
this demands a dialectical approach.  
 
3. 
Amongst those disaffected bourgeois sons who discovered Lukács was Walter 
Benjamin, who read History and Class Consciousness, while in Ibiza in 1924. In the 
period following his encounter with Lukács, Benjamin defines his future career path as 
a critic. The combination of reading Lukács, discussions with communists such as Ernst 
Bloch and Alfred Sohn-Rethel and his experience of Germany’s economic crisis and 
financial insecurities, pulled him towards what he called materialist criticism. In this 
period he begins to scrape together a living as a critic and journalist and radio presenter. 
His reviews and essays do not shy away from polemic, for he characterises his critical 
writing as sallies in an intellectual civil war. ‘The Critic’s Technique in Thirteen Theses 
from 1925 notes: ‘The critic is the strategist in the literary struggle.’1  
A spur to Benjamin’s interest in strategic criticism comes in 1929 in his 
meeting with Brecht, which leads to intensive work on the Brechtian aesthetic. To 
seriously wage the intellectual civil war against the many reactionary or incompetent 
fellow critics, it was deemed necessary to edit and publish a journal. Krisis und Kritik 
[Crisis and Criticism] was planned by Brecht and Benjamin in the autumn of 1930, 
drawing in left-wing figures such as Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse and others. Its 
character was political, ‘standing on the ground of class struggle’, and ‘its critical 
activity anchored in clear consciousness of the basic critical situation of contemporary 
                                                 
1 Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 1, Harvard, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA., 
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society’.2 The many forms of crisis – social, economic, political – were ever more 
manifest and become part of the context of the act of criticism. The journal was not 
conceived as an ‘organ of the proletariat’, but rather it would ‘occupy the hitherto 
empty place of a organ in which the bourgeois intelligentsia renders its account of the 
demands and insights, which alone allow it under current conditions to produce in an 
interventionist manner and with consequences, as opposed to the usual arbitrary and 
inconsequential modes.’3 The journal never appeared. In that same period Benjamin 
writes a kind of manifesto titled ‘Programme for Literary Criticism’. It contains forty 
theses. Number sixteen: ‘The function of criticism, especially today: to lift the mask 
of “pure art” and show that there is no neutral ground for art. Materialist criticism as 
an instrument for this.’ Benjamin treats artworks as bundles of symptoms and these 
are not just to be approached affirmatively, in statements such as ‘this captures well’, 
‘this expresses perfectly’– he talks of bringing out the importance of something 
seemingly peripheral through ‘negative criticism’ – which we might imagine as 
something like the phrase ‘the insistence on this format indicates the anxiety about the 
coming of new technical and social modes of conveying culture’. Benjamin writes of 
more or less ‘deeply hidden tendencies’ served by artworks and how these must 
become points of exposure. Criticism is a revelation of what is in the artwork that is 
tendentious, partisan, just as the critic’s interest in it is partisan.  
The notion of strategy comes at various points: in the fragment ‘The Task of the 
Critic’ from 1931.4 Benjamin recommends twice strategic criticism, and it appears to be 
concerned with a critic revealing not his or her own opinions about something, but the 
standpoint that they themselves possess. Benjamin emphasizes partisanship, taking a 
position and making that position explicit. The critic does something else to the text 
other than judging. Another fragment from 1931 reiterates that a critic is not there to 
‘pass judgment’ or have an opinion, but rather to trace out something in the work 
itself, the work that, once explained by the critic, that is, in other words, revealed as 
what it already is, becomes a repository of what Benjamin terms ‘truth contents’ and 
‘social content’. This reiterates, in another way, that insight from Lukács and Marx: 
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that the given is both true and not true. It is a real abstraction, an objective illusion. 
The text samples reality, its illusions as well as its motive forces. This is why 
Benjamin puts so much store by ‘quotation’ in book criticism, envisaging a review 
comprised entirely of quotation – it avoids the boredom of summary and gives over 
the matter of the text itself. The work contains the elements of its own critique. It is 
not extraneous matter, as such, that criticism introduces – it discovers the context in 
the text, the residues as artwork’s substance. It is the critic’s work of sifting through 
that is of interest. From this perspective, the artwork as such can be seen as just a 
temporary stage. He writes: ‘On the point that criticism is internal to the work: in the 
case of great works, art is merely a transitional stage. They were something else (in 
the course of their gestation) and become something else again (in the state of 
criticism).’5  
 
 
4. 
In parallel to this, in the 1920s, in One Way Street, with its subheadings retrieved 
from urban detritus, street signage and advertisements, and its jacket, by Sasha Stone, 
a dynamic, chaotic urban array of street furniture, vehicles, crowds and 
advertisements, Benjamin insists that writing should  
 
nurture the inconspicuous forms that better fit its influence in active 
communities than does the pretentious universal gesture of the book – in 
leaflets, brochures, articles and placards. Only this prompt language 
shows itself actively equal to the moment.
6
  
 
Benjamin proposed the urgent communication of the telegram, postcard, leaflet or the 
economically articulate photomontage. And quotation – a type of recycling - was at 
the core of this. In a letter to his friend Gershom Scholem in August 1935, Benjamin 
revealed how he set quoting - a salvaging of scraps - at the heart of his method. He 
described his efforts, in his researches for the Arcades project, ‘to hold the image of 
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history in the most unprepossessing fixations of being, so to speak, the scraps of 
being’.7 Here the word he uses for scrap is ‘Abfall’, something that falls off, garbage, 
a clipping, torn-off, a thrown away piece of urban detritus.  
 
5.  
Kurt Schwitters knew of scraps too, in many senses. Two of his Merzbaus were 
scrapped by circumstance, or at least ‘unfinished out of principle’, making them 
ultimately failed or incomplete works, Arguably, though, these were works, like 
Walter Benjamin’s Arcades project perhaps, that were made never to be finished, but 
rather reasons for living. Scraps were also the matter of his collages and montages and 
these were captured and re-directed in order to expand and extend the vocabularies of 
art. He discussed this re-usage many times, perhaps most pointedly in 1920, in an 
essay titled ‘Berliner BörsenKukukunst’, which mocks the art critic of a Berlin 
financial paper, who ‘does not have a clue about our times’8 and insists he might even 
re-use the newspaper, the critic and some ladies’ pantaloons as the abstracted material 
of his art. And he reiterated his practice in ‘The Aim of My Merz Art’, written in 
1938, in a period when the vocabularies of art were being decidedly truncated in his 
homeland, in the Degenerate Art touring exhibition, stating that ‘there does not appear 
to be a rule which prescribes that one can only make artworks from specific materials’ 
and so rubbish from waste bins presented itself a fine enough material for the task of 
composition.
9
 Schwitters also treated his own work as scraps, as remouldable, odds 
and ends, recycling postcard versions of his own works, such as or the more 
conventional Still Life with Challice or The Pleasure Gallows or Revolving, as 
collages for friends, obliterated partially by purloined bucolic scenes or other scraps. 
He scrapped his own image in promotional postcards too, merging himself Merzstyle 
with his creation Anna Blume, or women’s ready-to-wear clothing or a wheel.  
 
6. 
It would be banal to undertake a criticism solely based on the positivistic approach 
that states that the author is of this class, therefore the work is a manifestation of that, 
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simply. But this is what some of the orthodox Marxists and Stalinist thought passed 
for criticism. The Nazis, for their part, outlawed criticism in favour of ‘art 
appreciation’, but likewise their art appreciators also positivistically made the claim 
that ethnic origin or mental and political disposition of the author was the only key to 
understanding the meaning of the work. This approach, of course, excludes the idea of 
partisanship, of consciously adopting a stance, a standpoint. Benjamin is insistent that 
the old critical categories are no longer relevant – he names these later, in his essay on 
the work of art in the age of its technical reproducibility, as creativity, genius, eternal 
value and mystery. In contrast, he writes, ‘what is required now is a detour through 
materialist aesthetics, which would situate books in the context of their age.
10
 
Artworks draw off the world and time of their being made and it is this relevance that 
brings them to the fore or not. And it is this that may make something strangely out of 
its own time and within another. Benjamin reflects on this in his ‘Programme for 
Literary Criticism’, noting how, in the case of the war memoirs, at the moment of 
their making, there was no appetite for them. They were too objective, documentary 
in style, and the taste of the time, the time of inflation, was for inflationary, excessive, 
meandering works, the works of Expressionism. But, notes Benjamin in an 
extraordinary feat of economic determinism of meaning, after Expression came New 
Objectivity. Benjamin posits Expressionism as the extended borrowings of 
metaphysics, cosmic claims, excessive overdraughts of reality and New Objectivity as 
the consolidation of the debt, the interest incurred and now paid back, locking the 
world into the Real of money, the adherence to the very worldly Dawes Plan. In this 
act of critical apprehension, Benjamin situates the work in the context of its age, but 
he also includes the possibility of an out-of-timeness, that is, of a work that 
anticipates what is to come or comes too late to be meaningful in the terms assumed 
by it. 
 
 
7. 
In 1949, just before Adorno returned from his exile home in the USA to Germany, he 
wrote an essay titled ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’. Here criticism is discussed as 
something that had effectively disappeared, had become advertising or propaganda. 
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Cultural criticism turns into a form of ideology brokering. The essay explains why 
and how to remedy the situation. The starting point is not that the critic has no feeling 
for culture, but rather the opposite. The critic believes in culture too much, in the 
sense of severing it off from the rest of life, making culture a specialism, a Very Good 
Thing, as opposed to the rest of life that is not culture. While such a procedure 
appears to be an overvaluation of culture, it turns out to allow more fully just the 
‘valuation’ of culture – in the form of its commodification. Culture is a special 
uniqueness that is completely at odds with the rest of life, a luxury good, which can 
be bought. The critic is the broker of this specialty good, with the power to elect the 
successful – and as such has set himself or herself up as an expert, a cut above the 
mere punters, who the critic condemns as too enamoured of the mass commodity, 
undiscerning and in need of consumer advice. All of culture is segmented into market 
niches – high and low and each defines itself against the other, which becomes the 
main area of focus for the critic. High culture and popular culture, culture and non-
culture are cut off from each other conceptually – or define themselves in opposition 
to each other. But, notes Adorno, all culture: ‘ekes out its existence only by virtue of 
injustice already perpetrated in the sphere of production, much as does commerce’. 11 
Culture relies on the division of labour.  
Peculiar to high culture is that it presents itself as ‘free’, unlike mass culture 
that must be a slave to mass taste, and is openly bought and consumed. In being ‘free’ 
apparently – Adorno is thinking of radio concerts or artworks in galleries – it becomes 
a kind of advertisement for the system as is – which is so good that it provides culture 
for free. Moreover it serves up for free a culture that floats above such mucky 
concerns as economic accumulation and work (the base truths of the system). The 
semblance of freedom makes reflection on unfreedom more difficult. Apparent 
liberation of thought is a false emancipation (which is in slavery to economic 
exchange). Both artwork and critic appear to be placed outside society or above it - in 
order to judge. A motto from Adorno: ‘Whenever cultural criticism complains of 
“materialism”, it furthers the belief that the sin lies in man’s desire for consumer 
goods, and not in the organisation of the whole which withholds these goods from 
man: for the cultural critic, the sin is satiety, not hunger’.12 The critic has to 
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understand his or her role as bound up in the needs and machinations of society. That 
is to say, that even a notion of having a spontaneous relationship to the object – to 
approach art without predetermination, and without motive - is impossible, because 
the critic is pressurised by the weight of the existing social world to judge in line with 
prevailing opinion. Where once feudal authority dictated, now the anonymous sway 
of the status quo compels. Adorno endeavours to establish a criticism worthy of the 
name. Transcendent criticism sees the critic adopting a stance outside society and 
looking down on culture through a specific lens, say Marxism, the position to which 
the critic ascribes. It smashes this position up against the cultural form that becomes, 
then, only another exemplar of the miserable system, which the transcendent critic 
rejects in its entirety. Culture becomes just an ideological fiction supporting society 
and the transcendent critic wishes only to abolish it. Adorno notes: ‘In wishing to 
wipe away the whole as with a sponge, transcendent critique develops an affinity to 
barbarism’.13 Immanent criticism, in contrast, pays close attention to the 
particularities of the object. It does not assume that the world of the object is untrue – 
only that it may present a truth to the world as if it were instantiated in reality. To this 
extent, Adorno sees that immanent criticism has merits. It can reveal the falsity of the 
world through culture’s claims – most abstractly phrased claims – to freedom, 
autonomy. It shows the discrepancy between what the work says, in its meaning and 
structure, and what the world gives. The work of art is revealed through close analysis 
as contradictory parts.  But neither of these critical strategies are sufficient. Both 
together must be mobilised in what Adorno calls ‘dialectical criticism’. Each criticism 
becomes a critique of the other. The whole is perceived from the outside by a critic 
wielding a transcendent critical position. At the same time, the possibility of a ‘pure’ 
position outside is undermined. The work is considered closely in all its 
particularities, taken on its own terms as proposing a world, which may or may not 
bear resemblance to an external world from which it distances itself. Its internal 
articulation must be traced out to fully understand all its parts and how these parts 
express in relation to each other and to the context. This mimetic tracing echoes 
Benjamin’s idea of the quotation – the artwork is its own critique. At the same time, 
this discrepancy between the work’s and the world’s promises is highlighted, read 
against a social whole that denies fulfilment of the promise. Reflective distance must 
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be taken from the work, in order to bring another set of principles, standpoints to bear 
on it. This too echoes Benjamin’s sense that the perspective of the critic must be made 
obvious. In summary, there must be an outside to the artwork, but the outside is 
already inside the artwork. Dialectical criticism argues that there is no Archimedes 
point from which the whole can be surveyed – the dialectical moment means that he 
does not perceive existing reality as fixed, closed, a completely identical unity, but as 
a conflict between opposing forces – social, historical, natural ones - that marks itself 
on and in the artwork.. 
It is in this essay that the famous lines about the impossibility of writing 
poetry after Auschwitz first appear.  In time, these have transmuted into this: ‘all post-
Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage.
14
 But rubbish has uses, 
meanings, possibilities. Much as Adorno hates culture and criticism, a world without 
is unthinkable. So, culture, this rubbish, is double-marked: on the one hand, a product 
of unbearable division, On the other hand, it still holds open a promise of autonomy, 
of something other than labour and commerce. Its rubbish is its value. Its lie is also its 
truth.  
 
8. 
Modern life – speedy, technological, fragmented, alienating, transient - demanded new 
cultural forms. The metropolis, especially the one that is New York, incubates popular 
modern forms - illustrated magazines, radio, pulp crime fiction, movies and also the 
comic strip, included in every newspaper. American popular culture, in its very 
origins, is the critique of high culture, is satire, is polyglot absurdism, is dada or at 
least its ersatz, which makes the real thing redundant. That was the context of early 
animation, when New York exemplified modernity and anarchic and popular forms 
outbid dada. A few decades later and the geographical location of modern, popular 
culture had shifted westwards to California, to Los Angeles. Here was where cultural 
output was consolidating into the force that Adorno and Horkheimer would observe at 
close quarters, from 1941, and label the ‘culture industry’. Perhaps it could be said 
that a home-grown challenger to dada emerged again, this time via LA, home of 
kitsch and drama queens, a gigantic factory for the re-circulation of the pseudo 
folklore of Aunt Jemina or Little Sprout. Dada was called upon to rip apart the 
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perfectly sparkly stars and glossy strips of Studio output. But it came back under new 
conditions, and shorn of any traces of Old World disappointments in culture. Take for 
example the visual culture around the LA-based musician Frank Zappa. Zappa’s 
covers stand firmly in this undada-dada tradition. They do not draw on dada as such, 
rather they are authentic products of US popular modernity, brash, chaotic, multi-
layered, trashy and ambitious. It is dada brut. The album covers query the 
conventions of representation, specifically rock representation, as it had crystallized 
in the 1970s and onwards, in much the same way as dada visual practices query art 
conventions as they gelled in the late teens and 1920s. As well as collage and 
photomontage there are plenty of photographs on Zappa album covers. These are 
frequently distorted by photo-specific techniques, turned into drawings, solarised or 
treated in some way. The intervention into photographic immediacy is a way of 
criticizing photographic self-evidence, and is, like photomontage, a progressive visual 
practice, that uses aesthetic form to cast doubt upon the veracity and desirability of 
current conditions. The recuperated version of such visual culture is, of course, the 
solarised or psychedelically tinted image, which is an effort to emulate drug visions.  
In addition to this refracted photographic visual field, there is also drawing on 
the album covers - unusually perhaps for the rock tradition. Caricaturish, comic-book 
derived drawings on the albums covers were produced by Cal Schenkel, John 
Williams, Tanino Liberatore and Neon Park. This is not the castles–in-the-sky fantasy 
drawing of a Roger Dean on Yes albums. It is drawing that emerges from the tradition 
of cartooning and comics. Caricature is its mainstay. Caricature takes an essential 
truth about a figure, an event, an object, and manipulates it to express more truth 
about itself while diverging from or distorting original surface appearance. It is not 
simply a comic technique. It is a form of expression that captures something painfully 
acute. Noses feature frequently in Zappa’s caricatures. The nose is a small part of the 
whole human, but it is often the part that most defines them. Zappa knew this well, 
being defined by his nose. In the scale of things the differences in nasal architecture 
are fairly small, but these small differences are what form the basis of caricature. If 
one returns to the history of comic strip, one can find claims made for the Swiss 
experimenter Rodolphe Töpffer who is reputed to have invented the genre of bandes 
dessinées in the early-nineteenth century. Töpffer produced little albums of 
continuous strips, with characters in whimsical, nonsensical plots. Sometimes his 
strips plotted transformations of an object, for example, a face. The animators of 
Disney’s Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs used Töpffer-like variations in the shot of 
the dwarfs at the end of Snow White’s bed, their noses drooped over the bedstead, each 
face a little different from the others. The differences are small but significant. Disney’s 
noses are grotesquely phallic, and they hint at a relationship between the dwarves and 
Snow White that is nowhere to be found on the saccharine surface of Disney’s animated 
feature. The animators were of course much more worldly. Zappa and Schenkel made 
the same nose/phallus equation in their portrayal of Ruben and the Jets. These noses are 
primal forms that stick out or hang low, sexualized of course, primitive, and given 
their dog-likeness reminders of our animal cores, our origins and our selves once the 
veneer of civilization is scratched off 
 
9. 
Criticism today is fairly shabby. Much of it is either transcendent or immanent in the 
weak sense. Art journals and art journalism waste lots of ink on description – and, of 
course, it is easy to see where the business of promotion, censorship and marketing 
fits in with this. Even journals that might think themselves uninvolved in this type of 
work spend time on description – a kind of weak immanentism – elaborating in words 
what might be seen if a punter visits a gallery, or the critics recount plots of books and 
films, with no glimmer of what it might be like for the eyeball or brain to be exposed 
to experiential specificities. In academic criticism – and sometimes in press releases – 
the latest passing theory is flung at the artwork, in the hope it might stick, and 
contribute to hyping culture’s value. In other places, on the Left, for example, all is 
simply transcendent, in the crassest sense. Just as the Orthodox Marxist have long 
done, judgment is made not of the work and the contradictions that it might embody 
in its form or in its content, but rather of the authors’ class passport or the explicit 
manifest content on the surface. Prizes are awarded to the work or the art worker who 
affirms the transcendent set of values held by the reviewer. Art criticism is 
affirmation of art, including the affirmation of art that is negative, that is critique.  
 
10. 
Of the contemporary more or less celebrated cultural critics on the Left, Fredric 
Jameson is the one who most adopts Adorno’s mantle of dialectical criticism, and 
quite self-consciously. Though he does it without any of the acid that Adorno’s bitter 
prose conveys, even if he did once make such claims, as in the 1971 essay ‘Towards 
Dialectical Criticism’:  
 
thought asphyxiates in our culture with its absolute inability to imagine 
anything other than what is. It therefore falls to literary criticism to 
continue to compare the inside and the outside, existence and history, to 
continue to pass judgment on the abstract quality of life in the present, and 
to keep alive the idea of a concrete future. May it prove equal to the 
task!
15
  
 
And he, in a sense, out-dialecticises Adorno to the extent that the criticism he 
exercises becomes quite diffuse, or even confused. Even that title ‘towards dialectical 
criticism’ is too much – dialectics is itself only a towards, a referring back and forth, 
an unfixed proposition, a momentary claim. Jameson’s is more than most a dialectic 
without synthesis and has fallen more recently, in his Archaeologies of the Future and 
in Valences of the Future, into a ‘utopology’ in which, for example, the American 
superstore chain Walmart can be both dystopian and utopian, depending on how you 
look at it, just by an act of imagination, by a revealing of the wish that is manifest in 
the form. Jameson thinks ‘the negative and the positive together at one and the same 
time’.16 He writes: ‘to apprehend it for a moment in positive or progressive terms is to 
open up the current system in the direction of something else’. 17 Failure can become 
success – but how, only if the critic says so, only if we want it to be? 
But Jameson does present a useful outline of the movement of the dialectic, 
which returns to Marx and Lukács and is of the essence (literally) for comprehending 
‘dialectical criticism’ in any and all of its forms. Jameson is describing the ‘tripartite 
movement of the Hegelian dialectic’, which is the one that all subsequent dialecticians 
adopt:  
 
                                                 
15 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of 
Literature, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1971, p. 416. 
16 Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic, Verso, 2009, p. 421. 
17 Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic, Verso, 2009, p. *. 
stupid first impression as the appearance, ingenious correction in the name 
of some underlying reality or ‘essence’; but finally, after all, a return to 
the reality of the appearance.
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In relation to capitalism this might mean the following. A stupid first impression: 
capitalism is the product of all humans making efforts. The ingenious correction: 
capitalism escapes human agency, is a great machine of abstraction. The return to the 
reality of the appearance: capitalism is indeed made by humans, but specific humans, 
the workers, perform specific types of work that keeps the system reproducing itself 
in the way it has currently adopted historically. Should we recognise this we might 
then make efforts to change it. Art might be a place in which that recognition can 
crystallise. Only might.  
 
11. 
But what if Benjamin’s dialectical criticism and Jameson’s dialectical criticism are 
parsed through the lens of dialectical criticism in Adorno’s sense. Considered 
transcendently, from the outside, dissolved into its context Benjamin’s is work written 
for money, for he has no academic position, is insecure, precarious – despite this his 
work is not, in the main, hackish. This circumstance of instability determines its form 
and contents and both provokes and circumscribes the standpoints presented within. It 
is work in tension with the world and strains to find places to place its opinions. Seen 
immanently, we might notice how it is marked by the sharp stabs of the capitalist 
system, its rhythms and demands, its modern speediness and engagement with fashion 
and the popular. It takes up its exposure to capitalism into itself, by hardening its 
position against the system, condemning it polemically and totally and making 
divisions between its insights and those of conformist critics. Benjamin’s short 
punctuated rhythms and polemical outbursts take up the confident mode of address of 
the media and its competition for distracted attention. It is timely, always valuing the 
contemporary and concerned with the precise moment into which a statement is 
uttered (which can include polemical returns of long forgotten materials, that flash 
back into his critical view in a certain moment). It utters something of Brecht’s 
impatience with laborious analysis, epitomised in the dialogue Benjamin reports 
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between a caption on a ceiling beam and a placard hanging around the neck of a toy 
donkey: ‘Truth is concrete. I, too, must understand it’. Jameson produces a different 
type of criticism. It is leisurely, expansive, full of curlicues and endless twiddles. It is 
the work of someone with much time on their hands – lucky recipient of a tenured and 
well-remunerated position – who can reflect upon the complexities of the system, and 
is not pressed into selling words for money – despite the vast quantities of these 
produced. Its attitude is mournful, contemplative and sometimes resigned. It ranges 
over all the world’s contents, looking at them this way and that, poking them over 
hundreds of pages to tease out their contradictions. Jameson appears to be writing a 
novel about capitalism, has the ambition to cover the whole world and all its contents 
in his endless books that include reprints of work now thirty years old, but not 
acknowledged as such, not updated. It leads to a peculiar timelessness for that work 
that would be about the urgent questions of our times. Jameson slips into science 
fiction styles at points, to press home his point about the death of imagination in 
mainstream literature and culture, high and low. It is now scuttled away to reside only 
in strange corners of genre fiction built on imagining probable impossibilities. 
 
 
12. 
Despite many who have wished it ill, art did not die - instead we have been 
condemned to endless re-runs of its impossibility, untenability or decomposition – 
and criticism maunders on. The post-war period saw first the emaciated practice of at 
after Auschwitz – bleak, dark stumps of negativity that found a space in galleries and 
museums, until social movements of the 1960s brought with them art as critical 
practice, as it turned to process, left the gallery, worked on, or more specifically 
against the commodity nature of art, to the point of its non-appearance as object or 
non-facture in the calls for an art strike, or, more graphically, its auto-destruction. Or 
they assailed it as in the most sublime détournements of the Situationists. Witness, for 
example, René Viénet’s 1967 tabulation of forms of subversion. He calls for the 
development of Situationist cartoons, films, capturing or pirating of radio and TV 
stations, and experimentation in the détournement of photo-romances and 
pornographic photos. In describing this Viénet reveals how much such political 
aesthetics is convinced that future humankind is incipient, and so work on existing 
conditions is a politics, for in meddling with the smooth images of the mass 
magazine:  
 
we bluntly impose their real truth by restoring real dialogues by adding or 
altering the speech bubbles. This operation will bring to the surface the 
subversive bubbles that are spontaneously, but only fleetingly and half-
consciously, formed and then dissolved in the imaginations of those who 
look at these images. 
 
This sets out from humans as they are, set within the politics of their conditions, in 
various ways a materialist and not an idealist procedure. But does it matter that the 
Situationists passed through highpoints of social struggle - and this is now, where 
everything is recuperated five minutes later in an imagescape that is hurry for 
innovation and sensation. And now, more than ever, the accord of art and politics is 
different to then, according to current disputes. Art and politics is a meeting made in 
endless debates on post-Kantian (dualist) (non-dialectical) categories batted 
backwards and forwards between the faithful interpreters of Alain Badiou, Jacques 
Rancière and Paulo Virno, adherents hopeful that these cryptic words justify an 
identification between a precarious freelance cultural worker (whose future success is 
as yet unguaranteed) and a displaced, flexibly labouring refugee. Or, in another 
register, art and politics is the winning combination for every city that renames itself 
‘creative city’, with its new philharmonic or casino in a reclaimed docklands. The 
slogan ‘audiences as producers’ is now converted into audiences as resolute 
consumers: the entire economy depends on it. And as such the best that might be 
hoped for is not a political unmasking in and of art, but rather a purchase on the 
ethical: politics is ‘the presence of others’, which is to say ethics  – and art’s role is to 
encourage populaces to think about ‘the other’, to leave their comfort zone for a brief 
glimpse of suffering. Such was the approach at documenta 12, the art show in Kassel 
in 2007, which organised itself around three questions to which it did not expect 
answers in response, just more questions: is modernity our antiquity? what is bare 
life? what is to be done (brackets: education)?, lest anyone fear it might actually be 
the old question of political organisation posed by Lenin. documenta12 set out to 
educate its viewers, to use art as the occasion to enlighten audiences about inequity in 
the world, the horrors that happen to others, not its audience, of course, but those in 
whose defence the art is made to speak and action for change is a future task once 
persuasion is done. Art is charged yet again with the role of civilising and 
humanising, a task that is also bestowed upon it, in other ways, by cultural policy and 
instrumentalisation of culture as social work in disadvantaged communities: otherwise 
known as the social exclusion or inclusion agenda, depending where you are.  
 
13. 
Sean Bonney’s cycle of poems ‘Baudelaire in English’ transports a poem across time 
and language – brutally, but, in so doing, in breaking with the politesse of 
faithfulness, it manages to sample its original historical energy (as does any montage 
aesthetic that valorises the specificity and historical sedimentations of the fragments it 
deploys) and release it into the frenzy of the present.
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 Bonney’s rendition of 
Baudelaire’s spleeny thoughts transports them into a contemporary idiom releasing 
something from them something apt for the present. The poems cannot be rendered in 
the traditional format of lines and stanzas. They are graphic, concrete. Here is an 
attempt to lay out one version of his ‘translation’ of ‘Spleen’: 
 
&& sometimes th entire City 
pisses me off // like (no similie) 
 it’s a tepid glass 
& we’re floating around on top 
inside our curvaceous mortality::: 
STINKS 
 
of an old poet’s ghost 
who wails && pesters in day out 
because ghosts are bored 
The church bells sound like helium soap 
&&&&& all the clocks are on fucking fire 
meanwhile inside bag-lady’s greasy Rag 
jack of hearts & the queen of spades 
are holding a seminar 
on the sinister scholarship  
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  of defunkt love;s chatter. 
 
Here is the poem as it should be: 
Any lingering languidity in Baudelaire’s mournful glance across the city is expunged. 
The language is banalised. The sentiment, elsewhere rendered as ‘When the low, 
heavy sky weighs like a lid/On the groaning spirit’ (William Aggeler) or ‘When the 
low, heavy sky weighs like the giant lid /Of a great pot upon the spirit crushed by 
care,’ (Edna St. Vincent Millay), is reduced and de-poeticised: ‘&& sometimes th 
entire City/pisses me off’. Then, no simile is found to complete the image and the fact 
of this lack is made explicit: ‘like (no similie)’.  Language is severely doubted – a line 
is translated, but crossed out and only the word STINKS is legible.  It is reduced but it 
is also stretched. Baudelaire’s idea of bored ghosts emerges not where it is in his 
poem, in the second line, but rather in a new stanza. The poem has been dissected, cut 
apart and the insides tumble down the page.  Then suddenly we are at the bells of 
Baudelaire’s fourth stanza, and, after that moment of touching on the poem again, it 
takes off somewhere else, with only the slightest echo of Baudelaire’s obstinately 
complaining bells in ‘defunkt love;s chatter’.  
One by one Bonney retranslates Baudelaire’s poetry into splenetic anti-verse. 
The question of ‘fidelity’ is posed differently. There is no careful and scholarly 
attention to meaning in the narrow sense. There is faithfulness to meaning in another 
sense – the viciousness of the original segues with the contingent urgency of the 
moment. Language is torn. French is mockingly translated and the English into which 
the poems are conveyed is one that can only splutter its senses out, on the edge of 
inarticulacy. The poem forms a dark inky splotch, against meaning, and yet also for a 
return of a viscerality, a materiality to language. A certain textual violence rips up 
something that has sedimented into unquestioned value. It is a language that hopes to 
have ingested terror, a terror that might once have been a component of art – even this 
art – but is now absent.   
Like Punk and like Surrealism, the language of Bonney’s bouleversed 
Baudelaire cannot shake off a simultaneous attraction and repulsion towards the streets, 
attraction and repulsion in relation to the vulgar commercial contents that line them, the 
violence that is more or less openly manifest on them, the rubbish that churns and 
churns on them. The graphic nature of Bonney’s poems impedes their easy reading, 
their untrammelled communicative ability, because their so obvious truths find it hard 
to make a passage into the world. It is as if all is turned backwards or on its head, in 
order to be all the truer. Their visual and graphic form suggests something splattered 
on the pavement, words that rose up in advertising and avant garde poetry smashed 
back down to the ground, to the common ground, in order to rally the troops, our 
troops, to combat a terror that is outside us, but in every syllable of our language, 
every grain of our word and world. Shattering linguistic coherence allows at least a 
glimpse of parallel words and worlds that might be yet articulated.  
 
A critic might get to see that, even rearticulate somewhere, make it better known to 
itself - but there ain’t much – or even any  - glory or cash in it.  
 
 
 
 
